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Security of Gas Supply with the ProGasNet simulator: an Uncertainty & Sensitivity Analysis Exercise 
Abstract 
Security of gas supply is a crucial stake for the European countries. The ProGasNet simulator has been 
developed by the European Commission to study the vulnerability of the gas network to different threats. With 
the simulator the European gas network (or a portion of the network) can be modelled. But several 
uncertainties are present in the models. Therefore, it is important to analyse the impact of these uncertainties 
on the model-based inferences. This report presents an uncertainty and sensitivity exercise of the security of 
gas supply model of an anonymised EU gas transmission network of several members. The uncertainty analysis 
shows that, for some scenarios of gas supply disruption, due to the uncertainties in the input parameters it 
cannot be clearly concluded whether the network is reliable (i.e. can supply the demand of the countries) or 
not. The sensitivity analysis points out the uncertain inputs mostly responsible for this lack of precision. It is 
found that priority should be given to the better assessment of the peak demand of the studied countries if one 




Foreword .............................................................................................................. 2 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ 3 
Executive summary ............................................................................................... 4 
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 5 
2 The ProGasNet simulator .................................................................................... 6 
2.1 The ProGasNet computational algorithm ......................................................... 6 
2.2 The case study: network/data ....................................................................... 8 
2.3 Supply scenarios ....................................................................................... 11 
2.4 Results of the ProGasNet simulations ........................................................... 11 
3 Uncertainty & sensitivity analysis methodology.................................................... 14 
3.1 Probabilistic framework .............................................................................. 14 
3.2 Uncertainty analysis: the Monte Carlo method ............................................... 16 
3.3 Quantitative sensitivity analysis ................................................................... 17 
3.3.1 The variance-based sensitivity indices .................................................. 17 
3.3.2 Polynomial chaos expansions .............................................................. 17 
3.4 Qualitative sensitivity analysis ..................................................................... 18 
3.4.1 The Monte Carlo filtering ..................................................................... 18 
4 Uncertainty & sensitivity analysis: Results and Discussion..................................... 21 
4.1 Model output selection ............................................................................... 21 
4.2 Analysis method selection ........................................................................... 21 
4.3 Results for Country 1 ................................................................................. 21 
4.4 Results for Country 2 ................................................................................. 24 
4.5 Results for Country 3 ................................................................................. 26 
4.6 Further analysis with MCF ........................................................................... 26 
5 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 28 
List of abbreviations and definitions ....................................................................... 31 
List of figures ...................................................................................................... 32 
List of tables ....................................................................................................... 33 
 2 
Foreword 
This deliverable was carried out under the umbrella of the European Commission 
Competence Centre on Modelling.  
The Competence Centre on Modelling promotes a transparent, coherent and responsible 
use of modelling to underpin the evidence base for EU policies. It leverages the modelling 
capacity and competences across the Commission and beyond. Starting with the 
Commission-wide modelling inventory MIDAS, it supports a proper documentation, use, 
and reuse of models. It further helps identifying common approaches to quality and 
transparency of model use, and establishes a Community of Practice on Modelling.  
Within the Competence Centre on Modelling, the SAMO1 team has the mission to carry 
out uncertainty and sensitivity analyses of EC workhorse models, to conduct research in 
this field, to provide tools, training and ad hoc scientific support to model users in order 
to enhance the robustness of model-based evidences in the European Commission.  
For more information on the Competence Centre please visit https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/ 
modelling. 
 
                                           
1 Acronym for Sensitivity Analysis of Model Output 
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The report presents an uncertainty and sensitivity analysis exercise of the security of gas 
supply model implemented in the probabilistic gas network simulator ProGasNet. The 
study aims to identify and rank the model parameters that most significantly affect the 
security of supply. The sensitivity analysis results are important for model improvements, 
better understanding of the simulation process and especially for identification of areas 
where to target further research. 
Policy context 
The ProGasNet simulator has been developed with the primary purpose to quantify the 
security of gas supply situation in probabilistic metrics. The simulator can be used to 
perform risk assessment of the gas transmission network as required by the EC Reg 
994/2010. In addition, the simulator can evaluate infrastructure development plans and 
projects of common interest. ProGasNet was used in vulnerability assessment which 
could be of interest to the critical infrastructure protection policy-makers.  
Key conclusions 
The study showed the potential and usefulness of sensitivity study applied to the 
ProGasNet gas network model. It has not only identified the most important model 
parameters for which more attention should be paid during the estimation process of the 
input parameter values, but also provided useful insights into the simulation process by 
confirming, e.g., the heterogeneity of the network from a sensitivity analysis perspective.  
Main findings 
The model was run for four different scenarios representing different disruption 
situations. The study confirms the results already observed in other studies that some 
disruption scenarios affect only part of the network (e.g. specific countries) while other 
parts of the network are not affected. This clearly indicates heterogeneity of the network 
and the need for further infrastructure development. The most important parameters for 
each country are identified, and peak demand value is the main parameter for the three 
countries. Therefore better assessment of the peak demand is crucial to guarantee the 
reliability of the results provided by ProGasNet. 
Related and future JRC work 
The JRC currently develops two other models for the gas transmission network analysis: 
GEMFLOW mass-balance model and EUGas physical model. The models have different 
granularity, geographical coverage and outputs, but they all have many common input 
data needs. They can be used to estimate the values of some of the ProGasNet input 
parameters. The sensitivity analysis has highlighted important directions toward which to 
investigate in order to enhance the reliability of the ProGasNet model responses. 
This work was carried out under the umbrella of the European Commission Competence 
Centre on Modelling. The Competence Centre promotes a transparent, coherent and 
responsible use of modelling to underpin the evidence base for EU policies. The 
Competence Centre, which was launched in 2017, is hosted by JRC and draws on the 
expertise of modellers and policy officers across the Commission. 
Quick guide 
The report is structured in three main parts:  
— Description of the ProGasNet simulator; 
— Description of the methodology to perform sensitivity and uncertainty analysis; 
— Analysis of the results and discussion; 
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1 Introduction 
The Competence Centre on Modelling, hosted by the Modelling, Indicators and Impact 
Evaluation unit of the Joint Research Centre has been created to promote a responsible, 
coherent and transparent use of modelling to underpin the evidence base for EU policies. 
The Sensitivity Analysis group (SAMO), part of this Competence Centre, promotes the 
responsible use of models by acknowledging and accounting for uncertainties in model 
inputs. For this purpose, the SAMO group proposes training, ad hoc support and 
statistical tools to model users to carry out this kind of analysis. 
The present report describes one of the first applications of uncertainty and sensitivity 
analysis of model responses conducted by the SAMO group. It is a joint work between 
Unit I.1 and Unit C.5 of the Joint Research Centre, an ad hoc support to the study of the 
vulnerability of a gas natural network between three European countries. 
Natural gas networks can be viewed as complex technical systems, which are exposed to 
various threats, for example technical failures, natural disasters and human/political 
uncertainties. As a consequence of these threats, a subset of network components might 
fail. In order to simulate security of gas supply due to component failures/attacks, the 
probabilistic gas network simulator ProGasNet (Probabilistic Gas Network Simulator) has 
been developed.  
ProGasNet is able to model, in a single computer model, capacity and reliability 
constraints of a natural gas network. The physical model is based on graph theory 
(maximum flow algorithm), whereas component failures are simulated by the Monte-
Carlo method.  
The ProGasNet simulator has been developed with the primary purpose to quantify the 
security of gas supply situation in probabilistic metrics. The simulator can be used to 
perform risk assessment of the gas transmission network as required by the EC 
Regulation 994/2010. In addition, the simulator can evaluate infrastructure development 
plans and the proposed projects of common interest. ProGasNet was used in vulnerability 
assessment which could be of interest to critical infrastructure protection policy makers. 
Despite of the insightful information that can be obtained regarding the security of gas 
supply within European regions with this software, still ProGasNet remains a strong 
approximation of the reality of gas supply in Europe (simplified assumptions, quasi 
steady-state modelling, lack of knowledge about some parameter values, etc). Therefore, 
it is important to assess the impact of epistemic uncertainties in gas network models in 
order to point out those sources of uncertainty that have an impact on the model 
responses of interest. Identifying important sources of (epistemic) uncertainty allows to 
guide further investigation for possible improvements of gas network models. 
Therefore, an uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of a gas network model has been 
carried out. The selected network was an EU gas transmission network of several 
member states. The model is based on realistic network topology and data, but due to 
sensitivity of information, the network is anonymised. The study aims to identify and 
rank the model parameters that most significantly affect the security of supply. 
Additionally, the analysis has also provided fruitful information about the studied gas 
transmission network model by highlighting for instance its weaknesses. 
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2 The ProGasNet simulator 
The ProGasNet simulator is the JRC in-house developed software tool currently in use at 
the Energy Security, Systems and Systems and Market Unit of the Directorate of Energy, 
Transport and Climate. ProGasNet is used for experimental simulation-based security of 
supply analyses of selected European gas transmission networks. Usually, one million 
Monte-Carlo simulations are automatically solved within one hour on a single-core 
processor computer. The software tool can make use of a multi-core computer, as 
multiple simulations (Monte Carlo runs) can be evaluated independently. 
In order to concurrently model both reliability and capacity constraints of gas 
transmission networks, ProGasNet uses a stochastic network representation, where each 
node and edge of the flow network can randomly fail, according to a given probabilistic 
model. The component failures are sampled by the Monte-Carlo simulations. In each 
simulation, a maximum-flow optimization problem with a user defined priority of supply 
pattern is solved. 
In ProGasNet, a stochastic network flow model with a priority supply pattern is assumed 
and used for probabilistic reliability assessment of gas networks. The ProGasNet 
algorithm is robust as well as flexible and also able to deal with various priority-supply 
strategies. The default version of the algorithm uses a priority supply pattern based on 
geographical distance from the source node: Nodes geographically closer to the gas 
source are served first. 
The ProGasNet software tool is suitable for evaluation of new energy infrastructure, 
either real or virtual (Praks, Kopustinskas, & Masera, 2015), bottleneck analysis 
(Kopustinskas & Praks, 2015), time-dependent gas storage analysis and component 
importance ranking. In order to detect and analyse weak parts of gas networks, we also 
test approaches for reusing ProGasNet results for vulnerability and resilience analyses 
(Praks, Kopustinskas, & Masera, 2017). 
2.1 The ProGasNet computational algorithm 
The ProGasNet estimates consequences by applying a maximum flow (MF) algorithm. 
This algorithm has already been tested on gas transmission networks of several EU 
countries. The mathematical description of the MF problem is a standard problem in 
graph theory (Deo, 2008). 
Let us consider a network having m nodes and n arcs which carries natural gas. We 
associate with each arc (i, j) a non-negative integer flow with an upper bound of uij. We 
shall assume throughout the development that the u-values (arc capacities) are finite 
integers. In such a network, we wish to find the maximum amount of flow from the 
source node 1 to the sink node m. 
Let f represent the amount of flow in the network from node 1, called the source, to node 
m, called the sink. Then the maximal flow problem may be mathematically formulated as 
an optimization problem with constraints: 
Maximize f subject to 












𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 1
𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 1 or 𝑚
𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑚
  ,  
 𝐹𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚  ,  
 𝐹𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚  ,  
where the sums and inequalities are taken over existing arcs in the network. Here the 
symbol Fij represents the flow from node i to node j. This is called the node-arc 
formulation of the MF problem since the constraint matrix is a node-arc incidence matrix. 
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The aim of the optimization problem is to maximize the value of f which represents the 
amount of flow passing from the source node to the sink node. The first constrain 
represents a conservation of flows: the sum of the flows entering a node must equal the 
sum of the flows exiting a node, except for the source node and the sink node. The 
second constrain represents capacity: the flow of an edge is non-negative and cannot 
exceed its capacity. The optimization problem of the MF can be solved by various 
approaches, for example by linear programming or Ford–Fulkerson algorithm, which finds 
directed paths from the source node to the sink node with available capacity on edges in 
this path. In the algorithm, this path-searching process is repeated until no additional 
flow can be added to this directed path. The algorithm uses the concept of so called 
residual networks, which represents the maximum additional flow that can be sent from 
any node i to any node j using the arcs (i, j) and (j, i). The case of multiple sources and 
sinks, involving several source nodes s1, s2,…, sk and several sink nodes t1, t2,…, tr, and 
where the flow from any source can be sent to any sink, it is known as Multiple Sources 
and Sinks problem, and can be straightforwardly converted into a one-source and one-
sink problem: let us introduce a virtual source s (virtual source node) with edges (of 
unlimited capacity) directed from this virtual source s to all source nodes s1, s2,…, sk. 
Furthermore, let us introduce a virtual sink t (virtual source node) with edges (also of 
unlimited capacity) directed from all sink nodes t1, t2,…, tr to the virtual sink t. Then the 
problem of maximizing the total value of the flow from all sources is then the same as 
that of maximizing the value of the flow from s to t.  
In each Monte-Carlo simulation step, the deterministic maximum flow model with 
sampled component network failures is solved as described above. The algorithm uses 
linear algebra operations for the priority supply pattern, in order to reorder network 
elements according to the distance based approach (Praks, Kopustinskas, & Masera, 
2015). In order to improve the readability of the pseudo-code, the algorithm is expressed 
by the matrix form. The stochastic flow network algorithm with priority supply pattern 
based on distance from source includes the following steps: 
a. P = initP(L, pf) {Initializing and defining failure probability matrix of network 
elements} 
b. for i=1,2, … nsteps  {Main Monte-Carlo loop} 
c. Crnd = randpert(C, P) {Failed elements have reduced capacity} 
d. Lrnd = clear_failured_elements(L) {Totally failed elements are not reachable} 
e. d = distance (Lrnd). 
f. [dsorted, ix] = sort(d) {The row vector d is sorted by the ascending order} 
g. Π = speye(t) {Sparse identity matrix of order t } 
h. Π = Π(ix,:) {Permutation matrix of elements according to the distance-based 
approach} 
i. Crnd = Π × Crnd × Π
 T {Distance -based permutation of the capacity matrix Crnd} 
j. f = maxflow(1, t, Crnd)  
k. Fi = Π
 T × f × Π; {Inverse transformation of the flow vector f} 
l. end 
 
Let us describe the algorithm. Step a is used to define the failure probability matrix P of 
the network elements. Then in Step b, the Monte-Carlo simulation starts. Network 
elements, which are stored in the capacity matrix C, are subject to a random failure, 
according to the failure probability matrix P. In Step c the Monte-Carlo sampled capacity 
matrix is stored in matrix Crnd. 
The total failure of the network element causes the component inaccessibility, which can 
be coded in the algorithm by an infinity distance penalty. For this reason, in Step d the 
length matrix must be updated. In this way, in case some network component suffers a 
total failure, the affected network element is not accessible from the source node and the 
corresponding element of the length matrix Lrnd has to be updated. 
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The algorithm can be also used for modelling the partial failure of a multi-state 
component, which can be expressed by a partial reduction of the component capacity. 
Contrary to the total failure, in case of a partial failure the affected network component 
remains accessible, so the update of the length matrix Lrnd in Step d is not necessary. 
In Step e the distance vector d is computed. The vector d contains the distance of the 
shortest paths between the virtual source node and all remaining non-virtual nodes. An 
entry j of vector d represents the distance of the shortest path from the virtual source 
node 1 to node j. We used the MATLAB tool Bctnet based on Dijkstra's algorithm. 
Contrary to the classical Dijkstra's algorithm, it is not necessary to compute the full 
distance matrix, as only the distance from the virtual source node is used in our 
algorithm.  
In Step e, the distance vector d is sorted by the ascending order to vector dsorted, in 
order to identify the priority for the node commodity supply, because the network 
elements geographically close to the source node (minimum distance according to length 
matrix L) have to be served first. The vector ix contains the indices satisfying dsorted= 
d(ix). 
In Step g the matrix Π of order t is created, in order to form the permutation matrix. The 
matrix Π has initially ones on the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere (identity matrix). In 
order to save computer memory, one can exploit the scarcity pattern of the matrix Π. 
In Step h a permutation matrix Π of a graph isomorphism problem is computed 
according to the distance from the gas source, in order to transfer the original model to 
the distance-based approach by a dynamic reordering of the network elements. Columns 
of the matrix Π are permuted according to the indexes produced in Step f. 
In Step i, the graph isomorphism task is computed by linear algebra operations. 
Then, in Step j the flow vector f of the Maximum flow algorithm is computed. The aim is 
to maximize the commodity flow from the virtual source node 1 to the virtual sink node t, 
according to given constraints. In our computer implementation, we used the above-
mentioned Ford–Fulkerson algorithm. 
To finish the simulation, in Step k the computed flow vector is transformed back to the 
original problem by the inversion linear algebra operation. As the permutation matrix Π is 
sparse and orthogonal, the linear algebra operations are very fast and stable. The 
transformed flow vector is stored in the optimal flow matrix F which, once the Monte-
Carlo simulations achieved, is ready for further exploration with statistical methods 
enabling the monitoring of the flow patterns generated. 
2.2 The case study: network/data 
Figure 1 shows topology of the study case gas transmission network. It is based on a 
real regional network topology and data, however geographical location is not displayed. 
The transmission network GIS data are converted to a graph by creating nodes and links 
(edges). The nodes are: 
— Demand nodes (consumers connected to pressure reduction stations of the 
transmission network; 
— Compressor stations; 
— Supply nodes (storages, LNG terminals, import points at cross-borders). 
The network links (edges) are typically pipelines. The model explicitly considers two 
parallel pipelines as two components (double links between nodes). 
The basic network data are the same as already reported (Kopustinskas & Praks, 2015). 
Here we replicate only the most important network data.  
The demand nodes are determined by daily demand values, see Table 1. These numbers 
represent peak demand values. But we can use also average winter or summer 
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consumption values, depending on the purpose of the study. Table 2 shows maximum 
capacities and type (pipeline, UGS or LNG) of input supply nodes. In case of underground 
gas storages (UGS), also the output values of not fully loaded storages can be used. The 
total maximum supply capacity is 83.6 mcm per day. Note that nodes 2 and 19 are the 
main gas sources in the network. The total network peak demand is 45.9 mcm/d, so the 
network in theory has certain degree of spare capacity to compensate supply disruptions. 
The experience of different analysis already performed shows that depending on where 
the disruption happens, internal bottlenecks in the network prevent from full usage of 
this spare capacity (Kopustinskas & Praks, 2015). 
Figure 1. Topological layout of the gas network. 
 
Source: JRC developed simplified topology based on data obtained from the countries TSOs. 
Table 1. List of non-zero demand nodes in countries no. 0, 1, 2 and 3.  
Node Demand(1)  Country Node Demand  Country 
id. (mcm/d)  id. id. (mcm/d) id. 
4 0.1 1 36 4.2 1 
5 3.2 1 37 1.3 2 
6 0.1 1 39 0.3 1 
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8 0.1 1 41 0.6 2 
9 0.1 1 42 0.6 2 
10 1 1 43 0.2 1 
13 0.5 1 44 0.7 1 
17 0.1 1 45 1.3 1 
18 8.5 2 47 0.1 1 
20 0.6 2 48 1.8 1 
25 0.5 3 49 0.2 1 
26 0.8 3 51 7 0 
27 3 3 52 0.6 1 
28 6 0 53 0.1 1 
30 0.5 3 55 0.2 1 
33 0.5 3 57 0.2 1 
34 0.5 2 58 0.3 1 
35 0.1 1 60 45.9 SUM(2) 
(1) The gas demand is represented by mcm/d (millions of standardised cubic meters per day). 
(2) Node 60 represents the total demand in the network (SUM). 
Source: JRC data elaborated from the countries TSOs data. 




2 Pipeline 31.2 
10 LNG 10.2 
11 Pipeline 7 
19 UGS 30 
29 Pipeline 4 
38 Pipeline 1.2 




For each network component, failure data must be provided. The following components 
(nodes) are considered for failures: 
— Compressor station (CS) failure: 2.5E-01/yr; 
— Underground storage failure: 1.0E-01/yr 
— LNG terminal failure: 1.5E-01/yr 
— Pipeline failure: 3.5E-05 /km/yr. 
The model uses annual failure data (probability of failure per year), however when 
simulations are performed, one month interval is considered. It is assumed that the same 
peak consumption in the network is constant during this one month period. 
The compressor station node normally is modelled as working or failed, for each state 
determining the corresponding capacity of the outgoing pipelines. The capacity reduction 
due to compressor station failure is normally estimated by hydraulic model computations 
or expert evaluation. As a consequence, due to a CS failure, capacity reduction by 20% 
of the inlet pipelines and also the outlet pipelines until the next connection node is 
assumed. This assumption is based on physical flow models, however is not accurate in 
all cases and also multiple CS failures will have more severe effects on the network 
operation. In the future, a physical model should be developed in order to estimate the 
effect of the CS failures more precisely. 
2.3 Supply scenarios 
In total four different supply scenarios were analysed. The first scenario is the reference 
scenario during which the system operates under normal conditions without predefined 
disruptions. The other three scenarios consider some disruption situations. 
Scenario 1: All currently available sources. Scenario 1 represents a basic scenario when 
all sources can be used for supply and the network components can fail randomly 
according to their reliability parameters.  
Scenario 2: Node 2 disruption. In this scenario, supply node 2 (the largest gas source in 
capacity) is not available. This scenario can test the system for the largest source 
disruption which can be classified as N-1 situation looking at the network globally. 
Scenario 3: Node 19 disruption. Scenario 3 runs the model with disconnected node 19. 
Thus, the second largest gas source, the underground gas storage, is not available. 
Scenario 4: Loss of two largest gas sources (Nodes 2 & 19). In this scenario, the two 
largest sources, i.e. node 2 and node 19 are not available. The underground gas storage 
can be unavailable due to technical problems, failures or inability to fill it up during 
summer period. Scenario 4 simulates a more challenging crisis in which the both sources 
of the highest capacity are unavailable. This scenario is used to demonstrate vulnerability 
of the network, when the largest and the second largest gas sources are lost 
simultaneously. The network can be supplied only with source nodes 10 and 11. 
2.4 Results of the ProGasNet simulations 
In this section, we illustrate the typical ProGasNet results to assess the security of gas 
supply. Note that although the network described in Figure 1 is analysed, the scenarios 
were defined differently and reflect different disruption situations. The results presented 
here are only for demonstration purposes and should not be linked to the sensitivity 
study results presented further in the report. 
Table 3 presents ProGasNet results of disruption scenarios at node 60, which represents 
the total network demand D=45.9 mcm/d. The column “D-mean” shows the expected 
gas deficit at the node, which is computed as a difference between demand D and the 
computed mean value of the supply. The results show probabilities of having less than 
certain predefined percentage (20%, 50%, 80% or 100%) of the required demand or 
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zero volume of gas (P(Y=0)). The same information is shown graphically by CDF plot in 
Figure 2, but any non-supply percentage level can be seen in the CDF plot.  
Table 3. The ProGasNet results for the total network supply (demand node 60) during 1 month 
with peak demand.  
Scenario D-Mean, 
mcm/d 
P(Y=0) P(Y<0.2D) P(Y<0.5D) P(Y<0.8D) P(Y<D) 
DH 12.9 0 1.0E-06 2.4E-04 1 1 
C 6.5 0 1.1E-04 8.3E-03 2.2E-02 1 
G 0.3 0 0 8.3E-03 2.1E-02 2.7E-02 
ABEF 0.1 0 0 2.0E-06 8.5E-03 1.2E-02 
Source: JRC calculations 
As Table 3 shows, under scenarios D and H, the mean gas deficit is 12.9 mcm/d and 
P(Y<0.8D) = P(Y<D) = 1. Under scenario C, the mean gas deficit is 6.5 mcm/d and 
P(Y<D) = 1, i.e. the required demand cannot be satisfied due to insufficient capacity of 
available sources or bottlenecks in the network (Kopustinskas & Praks, 2015). The other 
scenarios have the expected gas deficit close to zero. Moreover, scenarios A, B, E and F 
have statistically similar results, which are grouped in the same row of the table. Two 
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit hypothesis test with p-value=0.005 was 
used to determine whether two independent random samples are drawn from the same 
underlying continuous population. 
Figure 2. Security of gas supply by the empirical CDF function (total network demand case). 
  
Source: JRC ProGasNet modeling results. 
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Figure 3. Security of gas supply by the empirical CDF function (one country network demand 
case). 
 
Source: JRC ProGasNet modeling results. 
Figure 2 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the total network 
supply for all disruption case studies. It can be interpreted as follows: the monthly 
probability of having less than specific daily demand (gas volume q, on the horizontal 
axis) is given by the CDF(q) value (on the vertical axis). We assume that the daily 
demand is constant during the month.  
Network reliability generally depends on the network topology and also on the reliability 
of network elements. However, it is possible to identify input parameters of the 
ProGasNet model that can influence the shape of CDF plots, depending on the disruption 
scenario. A CDF can have visible “steps”. These CDF “steps” are mainly caused by gas 
facilities failures, which are listed at the y-axis of the CDF plot: 
 The expected monthly failure probability of the LNG is, according to the input data 
of the model, 0.15/12=0.0125, which is shown by the same symbol “LNG”.  
 The influence of the gas storage is shown by the symbol “storage” by the 
expected monthly failure probability of the gas storage: 0.10/12=0.00833. 
 The expected monthly failure probability that LNG, gas storage or both are failed 
is expressed by the symbol “both”. 
Figure 3 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the partial 
network demand (e.g. one country). The CDF results can be obtained for any part of the 
network demand (one city node, one country, a region of countries) depending on the 
purpose of the study. 
We can see that disruption scenarios D and H are the worst cases in terms of security of 
gas supply. On the other hand, scenarios A, B, E and F represent the best situation. 
Although these scenarios have approximately the same CDF plots of the gas supply at 
the global (summary) level, they have not only differences on the redundancy of the gas 
sources, but also differences at the node level. These aspects can be quantified in 
ProGasNet as well (Praks, Kopustinskas, & Masera, 2015).  
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3 Uncertainty & sensitivity analysis methodology 
3.1 Probabilistic framework 
Uncertainty in model predictions stems from the lack of knowledge about the process of 
interest (in the present case, about the gas transport), model simplification and 
parameters’ value. For some of the model inputs, it is possible to refine our knowledge 
about their probable value (that is, decreasing their uncertainty) but such a task is time 
consuming. Our strategy is i) to assign large but likely uncertainty ranges to the inputs of 
the gas network model, ii) to check whether this yields large uncertainty in the model 
predictions of interest and iii) to identify eventually those inputs that are mostly 
responsible for the predicted uncertainty. In step iii), it is expected that only a few of the 
uncertain inputs are identified as influential in order to reduce the effort to pay during 
the subsequent input uncertainty refinement. 
In the present study, twenty model inputs of the gas transmission network model 
described in section 2.2 have been deemed as uncertain. They are gathered in Table 4. 
It can be noted that some are assigned uniform distributions within plausible ranges 
while some others are assigned normal distribution. It is assumed that the model input 
values are independent of each other. These uncertainties reflect the experts’ belief 
before further investigation. The prior uncertainties being large reflect the fact that the 
experts (here the modellers) have a vague knowledge about model inputs uncertainty. 
Table 4. Input uncertainty distributions of the gas network model. 
 Label Parameter Baseline 
value 
Distribution (1) Type (2) Accuracy (3) 
 X1 Capacity of source N2 31.2 U(16,31.2) A L 
 X2 Capacity of source N19 30.0 U(15,30) A L 
 X3 Capacity of source N10 10.2 U(5,10.2) A L 
 X4 Capacity of source N11 7.0 U(3.5,7) A M 
 X5 Compressor station 
capacity reduction 
factor 
0.2 N(0.2,0.052) E M 
 X6 Peak demand of 
Country 1 
15.5 N(15.5,0.752) E L 
 X7 Peak demand of 
Country 2 
12.1 N(12.1,0.62) E L 
 X8 Peak demand of 
Country 3 
5.3 N(5.3,0.42) E L 
 X9 Failure frequency of 
LNG 
0.15 N(0.15,0.0152) E H 
 X10 Failure frequency of 
storage facility 
0.1 N(0.1,0.012) E M 
 X11 Failure of compressor 
station 
0.25 N(0.25,0.0252) E M 
 X12 Failure frequency of a 3.5E-05 N(3.5x10
-5,(3.5 E M 
 15 
pipeline x10-6)2) 
 X13 Capacity of DN1000 
pipeline 
30.6 N(30.6,1.52) E H 
 X14 Capacity of DN800 
pipeline 
17.1 N(17.1,0.862) E H 
 X15 Capacity of DN700 
pipeline 
12.1 N(12.1,0.62) E H 
 X16 Capacity of DN600 
pipeline 
8.1 N(8.1,0.402) E H 
 X17 Capacity of DN500 
pipeline 
5.1 N(5.1,0.252) E H 
 X18 Capacity of DN400 
pipeline 
2.8 N(2.8,0.142) E H 
 X19 Capacity of DN350 
pipeline 
2.0 N(2.0,0.12) E H 
 X20 Capacity of DN300 
pipeline 
1.3 N(1.30,0.0652) E H 
(
1
) U=Uniform distribution, N(,2)=Normal distribution of mean  and variance 2.  
(
2
) E stands for epistemic uncertainty as opposed to A- aleatory uncertainty. 
(
3
) The modellers belief regarding the assigned prior uncertainty: L=Low, M=Medium and H=High. 
Source: JRC estimations. 
 
The independence of the input variables allows writing the input joint probability density 
function (PDF) as the product of the marginal PDF’s, namely, 
 
𝑝𝑥(𝒙) = 𝑝1(𝑥1)𝑝2(𝑥2) … 𝑝20(𝑥20)      (1) 
with, for instance, 
𝑝1(𝑥1) = 𝑈(16,31.2) = {
1
31.2 − 16
 if 𝑥1 ∈ [16,31.2]












Therefore, the model inputs are treated like random variables as well as the model 
responses. In the sequel, the model response of interest is denoted Y. Without loss of 
generality, the latter is assumed scalar and only function of the uncertain inputs 
X=(X1,…,X20), that is 
𝑦 = 𝑔(𝒙) 
where the lowercase means the value (e.g. y) taken by the random variable (e.g. Y). 
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We define the following two mathematical operators: 
𝐸(𝑌) = ∫ 𝑔(𝒙)𝑝𝑥
𝑅20
(𝒙)d𝒙 
𝑉(𝑌) = 𝐸 ((𝑌 − 𝐸(𝑌))
2
) 
which are respectively the mathematical expectation of Y and its variance. We also define 
the conditional expectation and conditional variance as follows 
𝐸(𝑌|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖) = ∫ 𝑔(𝒙)𝑝𝑥−𝑖𝑅19 (𝒙−𝒊)d𝒙−𝒊  
𝑉(𝑌|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑌
2|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖) − (𝐸(𝑌|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖))
2
 
where 𝒙−𝒊 = 𝒙/𝑥𝑖. 
3.2 Uncertainty analysis: the Monte Carlo method 
Uncertainty analysis aims to characterize the uncertainty on Y knowing the uncertainties 
on the X-variables. This can be achieved by propagating the input uncertainties through 
the model response. The uncertainty in Y is fully characterized by its marginal PDF 
defined as, 
𝑝𝑦(𝑌 = 𝑦) = ∫ 𝛿(𝑦 − 𝑔(𝒙))𝑝𝑥𝑅20 (𝒙)d𝒙     (2) 
where  is the Dirac distribution function. Eq.(2) can be roughly estimated by the 
following integral, 
𝑝𝑦(𝑌 = 𝑦) ≃
1
Δ
∫ ΠΔ(𝑦 − 𝑔(𝒙))𝑝𝑥𝑅20 (𝒙)d𝒙    (3) 
where ΠΔ is the window function defined as, 
ΠΔ = {







0                  otherwise       
 
Eq.(3) can be estimated via Monte Carlo simulations in which one randomly draws N 
input set values with respect to the input joint PDF (Eq.(1)), runs the model and 
evaluates the output vector y=(y1,…,yN) and finally, for a given value y and window’s width 












Alternatively, Eq.(3) can be evaluated with the smoothing kernel-density approach 
(Parzen, 1962; Botev, Grotowski, & Kroese, 2010) which is known to provide smoother 
and more accurate approximations. 
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3.3 Quantitative sensitivity analysis 
3.3.1 The variance-based sensitivity indices 
The theory of variance-based sensitivity analysis was elaborated by Ilya M. Sobol’ (Sobol, 
1993). Sobol’ proved that if g(x) is square-integrable, then it can be cast onto orthogonal 
functions of increasing dimensionality as follows, 
𝑔(𝒙) = 𝑔0 + ∑ 𝑔𝑖1(𝑥𝑖1)
𝑛
𝑖1=1
+ ∑ 𝑔𝑖1𝑖2(𝑥𝑖1 , 𝑥𝑖2)
𝑛
𝑖2>𝑖1
+ ∑ 𝑔𝑖1𝑖2𝑖3(𝑥𝑖1 , 𝑥𝑖2 , 𝑥𝑖3)
𝑛
𝑖3>𝑖2
+ ⋯ + 𝑔1 …𝑛 (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) (4) 
with 𝐸(𝑔𝑖1…𝑖𝑠 × 𝑔𝑗1…𝑗𝑡) = 0 if 𝑖1 … 𝑖𝑠 ≠ 𝑗1 … 𝑗𝑡 and 𝐸(𝑔𝑖1…𝑖𝑠 × 𝑔𝑖1…𝑖𝑠) = 𝐷𝑖1…𝑖𝑠. 
Then, it is straightforward to prove that the total variance of y=g(x) is, 









+ ⋯ + 𝐷1 …𝑛  (5) 
where 𝐷𝑖1…𝑖𝑠 is a positive partial variance. 
This latter equation says that the total variance of the model response is explained by 
the partial contributions of each input variable. Each variable can contribute solely (e.g., 
𝐷𝑖1 is the sole contribution of 𝑋𝑖1) or by interaction with the other variables (e.g. 𝐷𝑖1𝑖2 is 
the partial contribution due to the interaction between 𝑋𝑖1 and 𝑋𝑖2). Dividing Eq.(5) by the 














     (7) 
which are normalized between [0,1]. The former is called the first-order sensitivity index 
while the latter is called the total-order sensitivity index of 𝑋𝑖1 and accounts for possible 
interactions involving this input variable. A model input is claimed irrelevant for Y if its 
total-order effect is close to zero. 
There are several computational methods to assess the Sobol’ indices. They can be 
classified as either sampling-based Monte Carlo approaches (Saltelli A. , 2002; Sobol, 
1993), spectral approaches (Saltelli, Tarantola, & Chan, 1999; Cukier, Fortuin, Petschek, 
& Schaibly, 1973; Sudret, 2008) or metamodeling-based approaches (Oakley & O'Hagan, 
2004; Buzzard & Xiu, 2011). In the present work, the polynomial chaos expansion 
spectral method is employed to assess the Sobol’ indices when the model response of 
interest takes continuous values. 
3.3.2 Polynomial chaos expansions 
The idea of polynomial chaos expansion (PCE) is to approximate each term in Eq.(4) by 
multi-dimensional orthonormal polynomials. The rate of convergence of such an 
expansion of course depends on the regularity properties of g(x). By exploiting the 
Parseval-Plancherel relationship, one obtains a variance decomposition such as Eq.(5). 
Therefore, we get (Wiener, 1938), 
𝑔(𝒙) = ∑ 𝑎𝜶𝜓𝜶(𝒙)𝜶∈𝑁𝑛       (8) 
 18 
where 𝜶 = 𝛼1 … 𝛼𝑛, with 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, is a multi-index indicating whether 𝜓𝜶(𝒙) depends on xi 
(𝛼𝑖 > 0) or not (𝛼𝑖 = 0), 𝑎𝜶 is the polynomial coefficient associated with 𝜓𝜶(𝒙)  which is the 
so-called multivariate orthonormal polynomial chaos that is written 
𝜓𝜶(𝒙) = 𝜓𝛼1(𝑥1) × … × 𝜓𝛼𝑛(𝑥𝑛) 
𝜓𝛼𝑖(𝑥𝑖) being the i-th degree univariate polynomial basis element (𝜓0 = 1). 
The expression of the univariate polynomial basis elements depends on the PDF assigned 
to the input variables. If 𝑥𝑖 ∼ 𝑈(−1,1), 𝜓𝛼𝑖(𝑥𝑖) is the Legendre polynomial of degree i, 
while if 𝑥𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0,1), 𝜓𝛼𝑖(𝑥𝑖) is the Hermite polynomial of degree i. One can rely on the 
Wiener-Askey scheme to choose the appropriate polynomial family (Xiu & Karniadakis, 
2002). 
Once a PCE expansion such as Eq.(8) is obtained, it is straightforward to prove that the 
total variance of g(x) is, 





by exploiting the orthonormality property of the polynomial basis elements, that is, 
𝐸 (𝜓𝜶(𝒙) × 𝜓𝜷(𝒙)) = 𝛿𝜶𝜷 
where 𝛿𝜶𝜷 is the symbol of Kronecker. 
























Hence, the issue with the PCE approach for variance-based sensitivity analysis is to 
assess the PCE coefficients. In this work this is achieved with the Bayesian sparse PCE 
developed in (Shao, Younes, Fahs, & Mara, 2017). With this approach, the variance 
decomposition is obtained from one single Monte Carlo sample of size N. This is very 
computationally cheap compared with other classical approaches (Saltelli A. , 2002; 
Saltelli, Tarantola, & Chan, 1999). The cost of the analysis is a criterion to keep in mind 
with a long-time run model like the ProGasNet. 
3.4 Qualitative sensitivity analysis 
3.4.1 The Monte Carlo filtering 
When the model response is not smooth enough, although the variance decomposition in 
Eq.(5) is still possible, polynomial approximations such as the PCE might fail at providing 
accurate results. This is particularly true when the model response takes discrete values 
(say, Y is Boolean). In that case, one can rely on qualitative sensitivity analysis methods. 
Such methods allow to identify the irrelevant inputs of the model but do not allow to rank 
the input variables by order of importance contrarily to the variance-based methods. 
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Monte Carlo filtering is a qualitative method and it is particularly suited when the model 
response is Boolean. 
Monte Carlo filtering was introduced in the early 80’s to address the following sensitivity 
analysis issue: Identifying the model inputs which are mainly responsible for producing 
model responses in a specific region of the output space (Hornberger & Spear, 1981). 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. This issue can be addressed with the variance-based 
sensitivity indices. But, because of the discrete form of the model response (in/out of the 
region of interest), the Sobol’ indices cannot be assessed with a cheap method like PCE 
or emulator-based approach. Indeed, to our best knowledge, there is no such reliable 
method to cope with, say, Boolean-type output. In that case, it is more convenient to use 
the qualitative Monte Carlo filtering (MCF) approach.  
In MCF, first the uncertainty on the model inputs is propagated into the model response 
by a Monte Carlo approach. This implies 1) to generate a random sample of X of size Nxn 
of the input values, 2) for each combination (xj1,…,xjn) of the input values, to evaluate the 
model response yj, j=1,…,N. This provides the response vector y=(y1,…,yN). Then, the 
input sample X is split into two subsamples, namely X+ and X-. Note that each column of 
the subsamples contains the realizations (i.e. random values) of each input variable. The 
subsample X+ provides the response vector y+ that takes values within the region of 
interest (i.e, y>yc) while X
- is the complementary subsample.  
The relevant inputs are identified by column-wisely comparing X+ with X-. Only those 
inputs that present significant differences in their filtered (split) subsamples are deemed 
influential. The differences between the pairwise subsamples are measured thanks to the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test). The latter measures how likely two subsamples stem 
from the same probability law. An example of MCF result is given in Figure 5. On the 
left-side of Figure 5, the filtered subsamples of X1 (elements of the first column of X
+ 
and X-) have significant different empirical CDF. This difference means that the filtered 
values of X1 gathered in X
+ and X- are not identically distributed. This indicates that to 
produce model responses in the region of interest (i.e. y>yc), X1 should be sampled in a 
specific way. On the right-side of Figure 5, the difference between the subsamples is not 
significant according to the KS-test. Therefore, it is unlikely that X2 is responsible for 
producing y-values in the critical region y+. 
It must be mentioned here that the MCF approach, as described in the previous 
paragraph, might fail at identifying some relevant inputs. This is because although the 
KS-test indicates how likely two subsamples stems from the same marginal PDF, it does 
not indicate how likely they have the same joint PDF. This information is not provided by 
the (two-sample) KS-test. Therefore, it is also recommended to analyse the Pearson 





−) is high then it indicates that X2 is 




Figure 4. The Monte Carlo Filtering approach. 
 
Source: JRC example. 
 
Figure 5. An example of MCF result. For X1 (on the left-side), the conditional cdf’s are significantly 
different while for X2 they are not. It can be concluded that X1 is likely responsible for producing 
model responses in the region of interest and not X2. 
  
Source: JRC example. 
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4 Uncertainty & sensitivity analysis: results and discussion 
4.1 Model output selection 
Given the computational time required to run ProGasNet, a sample of size 512 was 
considered. The input sample was generated according to the probability density function 
of each input variable (see Table 4). The low-discrepancy LP sequences of (Sobol', 
Turchaninov, Levitan, & Shukman, 1992) were employed. It required four days of 
calculation with ProGasNet to propagate the input uncertainty into the model responses 
for the four different scenarios under analysis. We recall that the four scenarios are: 
 Scenario 1: Reference scenario when all the gas sources are available 
 Scenario 2: Simulate a crisis during which pipeline source of node 2 (X1), the most 
important source in terms of capacity, is unavailable 
 Scenario 3: Source in node 19 (X2) is unavailable 
 Scenario 4: It is a critical case where the both Sources 2 & 19 are unavailable 
It is possible to analyse the impact of the model input uncertainty onto different model 
responses. For this purpose, while propagating the input uncertainty with a Monte Carlo 
sample, one has to save the different model responses of interest after each model run. 
In the present work, we have considered 20 different model responses, namely: 𝑆 the 
mean volume of gas supply, 𝑃(𝑆 = 0) the probability of none gas supply, 𝑃(𝑆 < 0.2𝐷) the 
probability of supplying less than 20% of the demand, 𝑃(𝑆 < 0.5𝐷) the probability of 
supplying less than 50% of the demand,  𝑃(𝑆 < 0.8𝐷) the probability of supplying less than 
80% of the demand and 𝑃(𝑆 < 𝐷) the probability of supplying less than the demand. 
Doing so for each country provided a set of 3x6=18 different model responses. 
4.2 Analysis method selection 
The different model responses are more or less sensitive to the uncertainty in the model 
inputs. Figure 6 shows the Monte Carlo simulation results obtained for Scenario 2. In 
Figure 6 outputs with a cross either do not change significantly (black cross) or do not 
change at all (red cross) and are not analysed. Outputs with a green frame are analysed 
with the PCE approach. The blue-framed outputs are analysed with MCF. It can be noted 
that some output variables do not vary at all (likewise 𝑃(𝑆 = 0) for country 1 & 2), some 
do not vary significantly (values less than 10-3), some others only take discrete values 
(e.g. 𝑃(𝑆 < 𝐷)) while the averages volume of gas supply 𝑆 vary continuously. 
Consequently, only those model responses that are significantly impacted by the input 
uncertainty are analysed in the sequel. 
The model responses that take continuous values are analysed with the polynomial chaos 
expansion. The output that take discrete values are analysed with MCF. 
4.3 Results for Country 1 
In this section, we analyse the predictive uncertainty on the mean volume of gas 𝑆 
supplied by the network to the different countries. The estimated probability density 
functions of the mean volume of gas supply (in millions of cube meters/day) for the four 
different scenarios are depicted in Figure 7. We note that the PDF’s are the same for 
scenario 1 (normal operation) and scenario 3 (Source 19 off). This means that the 
system is completely resilient to the failure of this important source regarding the gas 
supply in Country 1. When the main source of gas is off (scenario 2), the network 
remains quite resilient. However, as far as scenario 4 is concerned, the system 
completely fails at satisfying the gas demand (vertical dashed-line) although some 
quantity of gas is supplied. Notably, in the first three scenarios, according to the model, 
the ability of the network to supply sufficient gas volume depends on the true value of 
some of the uncertain input variables. Indeed, Figure 7 indicates that the system might 
fail at satisfying the gas demand under certain uncertain conditions, linked to capacity of 
sources which is subject to strong aleatory uncertainty.  
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Figure 6. Monte Carlo predictions of the 18 model responses of interest in Scenario 2.  
 
Source: JRC calculations and analysis. 
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Figure 7. Predicted uncertainty of mean gas supply for country 1 with respect to the different 
disruption scenarios. 
 
Source: JRC calculations and analysis. 
To guess which are the critical uncertain inputs responsible for the variability of this 
model response we have carried out a global sensitivity analysis for each scenario. Given 
that this model response takes continuous values, the PCE method is employed (see 
section 3.3.2). The first-order (Si) and total-order (STi) Sobol’ indices are gathered in 
Table 5. We recall that Si represents the amount of variance of the predicted mean gas 
supply explained by the input variable while the difference (STi-Si) represents the amount 
due to the interaction of the variable with the other ones. We note that only scenario 2 is 
subject to interactions. 
The results indicate that the accuracy of the model to predict the mean gas supply to 
Country 1 heavily depends on the knowledge of the peak demand in that country. This is 
particularly crucial for scenarios 1 & 3. When source N2 is off, then the model response 
becomes more complicated involving sources N10 and N11 (see Section 2.2 for their 
features). When both sources N2 and N19 are off (scenario 4), then the capacity of 
source N11 prevails for the mean gas volume supplied to country 1, the country peak 
demand (X6) becoming less relevant. In summary, to predict accurately the mean gas 
volume supplied to Country 1 it is crucial to know accurately the value of the following 
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Table 5. Relevant inputs for the predicted mean gas supply for country 1.  
Scenario Relevant inputs Si STi 
1 (Normal) X6 = Peak demand of Country 1 100% 100% 
2 (X1 off) X6 = Peak demand of Country 1 
X2 = Capacity of Source N19 







3 (X2 off) X6 = Peak demand of Country 1 100% 100% 
4 (X1, X2 off) X4 = Capacity of Source N11 
X6 = Peak demand of Country 1 







Source: JRC calculations and analysis. 
4.4 Results for Country 2 
The estimated PDF’s of the mean volume of gas supply for the four different scenarios 
are depicted in Figure 8. We note that when source N19 is off (scenarios 3 & 4), the 
predicted mean value of gas supply is much less than the demand of the country. This 
indicates that this source is very important for this country. However, the system is 
resilient to the failure of Source N2 (recall that it is the highest capacity source). This is 
due to the location of the country with respect to the sources and potential bottlenecks in 
certain connections. Indeed, bottlenecks can represent a non-negligible storage of gas. 
The most important input variable is the peak demand of the country 2 (see Table 6) 
when the system operates normally and when Source N2 is off. Surprisingly, we note 
that when Source N19 fails, the capacity of the system to provide gas to Country 2 also 
depends on the peak demand of Country 3 and the peak demand of country 1 (when N2 
& N19 off). This result is also a consequence of the priority algorithm implemented in the 
ProGasNet (See Section 2). Indeed, the latter supplies the closer demand nodes first 
before serving the other ones. Hence, if a country is far from the main sources of gas, it 
might be more subject to failure of gas supply. 
Table 6. Relevant inputs for the predicted mean gas supply for country 2.  
Scenario Relevant inputs Si STi 
1 (Normal) X7 = Peak demand of Country 2 100% 100% 
2 (X1 off) X7 = Peak demand of Country 2 





3 (X2 off) X8 = Peak demand of Country 3 





4 (X1, X2 off) X4 = Capacity of Source N11 
X6 = Peak demand of Country 1 







Source: JRC calculations and analysis. 
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Figure 8. Predicted uncertainty of mean gas supply for country 2 with respect to the different 
scenarios. 
 
Source: JRC calculations and analysis. 
 
Figure 9. Predicted uncertainty of mean gas supply for country 3 w.r.t. the different scenarios. 
Note that the results of the first three scenarios overlap. 
 
Source: JRC calculations and analysis. 
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4.5 Results for Country 3 
For Country 3, the system behaviour is simpler. The system is resilient to the failure of 
one of the main sources but it is incapable to provide gas to Country 3 when both main 
sources collapse (see Figure 9). This is an important result, revealing the country 
vulnerability to crisis. Crisis simulated by scenario 4 is unlikely to happen. The prediction 
of volume of gas supply heavily depends on the knowledge of the value of the gas 
demand in the country. 
4.6 Further analysis with MCF 
If the analyses of the model responses that take discrete values did not really provide 
further information, they confirmed those already obtained with the PCE in the previous 
sections though. The same important inputs have been identified for each country, for 
instance, (X2,X4,X6) for Country 1. For the sake of completeness, we present here the 
results obtained for Scenario 2 when considering the probability that the gas supply in 
Country 1 is less than the demand (i.e. 𝑃(𝑆 < 𝐷), see Figure 6 first row and last column 
plot). 
The Monte Carlo Filtering was performed by splitting the input sample in two 
subsamples: the first subsample containing the input sets that provided 𝑃(𝑆 < 𝐷) ≤ 0.5 
and the second one the input sets such that 𝑃(𝑆 < 𝐷) > 0.5. The empirical cumulative 
distribution functions of the different input variables are depicted in Figure 10. The red 
curves in Figure 10 are the CDFs of the original sample (uniform distribution), the blue 
curves are the CDFs of the filtered input sample for which 𝑃(𝑆 < 𝐷) ≤ 0.5. Only the plots 
with a frame have passed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the remainders have been 
rejected. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test concluded that only three variables out of twenty 
were significantly affected by the filtering. This indicates that the model response is 
sensitive to these three inputs, namely, (X2,X4,X6). As aforementioned, these three inputs 
were already identified as being important for the average gas supply. 
4.7 Further analysis with other methods 
It is worth mentioning that further analyses have been carried with other sensitivity 
measures and techniques which include: (i) the Pearson correlation coefficient, (ii) 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient, (iii) contribution to the sample mean and (iv) 
contribution to the sample variance (Tarantola, Kopustinskas, Bolado-Lavin, Kaliatka, 
Uspuras, & Vaisnoras, 2012). Pearson correlation coefficient measures the linear 
relationship between an input and the output. Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
captures possible nonlinear relationship between the two variables. The last two methods 
are qualitative graphical methods (Bolado-Lavin, Castaings, & Tarantola, 2009). All these 
methods are recommended for continuous model responses and as a consequence have 
been applied only to the mean of gas supply to each country. The results are not shown 
but they confirm those obtained in Section 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, albeit some differences in 
the ranking of the inputs by order of importance. 
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Figure 10. Monte Carlo filtering for scenario 2 and the output 𝑷(𝑺 < 𝑫) for country 1. 
 
Source: JRC calculations and analysis. 


























































































































The report presents an uncertainty and sensitivity exercise of the security of gas supply 
model implemented in the probabilistic gas network simulator ProGasNet. The selected 
network was an EU gas transmission network of several member states. It is based on 
realistic network topology and data, but due to sensitivity of information, the network is 
anonymised.  
The study aims to identify and rank the model parameters that most significantly affect 
the security of supply. The model was run for four different scenarios representing 
different disruption situations. It is found that the peak demand in each country is the 
key parameter whose precise estimation is very important for accurate model results. 
The study confirms, the results already observed in other studies, that some disruption 
scenarios affect only parts of the network (e.g. specific countries) while other parts of the 
network are not affected. Even more, due to existing bottlenecks in the system, supply 
disruptions in one part of the network cannot be restored from the other part even if 
there is enough gas available. This clearly indicates heterogeneity of the network and the 
need for further infrastructure development. 
Looking at each country, for Country 1, the peak demand is the most important 
parameter, followed by capacity of sources 19 and 11 and capacity of DN400 pipeline. 
This is important information for further development of the model and indicates where 
to target further research efforts. 
For Country 2, again the peak demand is the most important parameter, followed by 
capacity of source 19, DN500 and DN400 pipelines. Interestingly, for some scenarios, 
peak demands of Countries 1 and 3 are identified as important. This can be well 
explained by the fact that in certain disruption scenarios, lower demand in neighbouring 
countries allows better supply to the other countries. 
For Country 3, the supply is secured in case of scenarios 2 and 3, but in the case of 
unlikely scenario 4, the security of supply is threatened.  
The study showed the potential and usefulness of sensitivity study applied to the 
ProGasNet gas network model. It has not only identified the most important parameters 
of the model for which more attention should be paid during the estimation process, but 
also provided useful insights into the simulation process by confirming, for instance, the 
heterogeneity of the network from the sensitivity analysis perspective. 
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